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Abstract: The macroeconomic rationale for aid relates to its ability to supplement
savings, foreign exchange and government revenue, thus contributing to growth.
This processes presumes a simple Harrod-Domar context in which growth is driven
by physical capital formation. However, the macroeconomic reality of aid is more
complicated. Three areas of complication are discussed: (i) the effects of aid on
fiscal behaviour, (ii) debt problems and (iii) Dutch disease effects. In the long run,
rather than merely filling gaps, aid should help close gaps, since reliance on future
aid and foreign borrowing is thus diminished and economic policy autonomy is
increased. Closing the savings gap entails financial and technical support for
mobilisation of domestic savings. Closing the trade gap entails supporting a macro
environment conducive to export growth, helping to expand and improve physical
infrastructure and direct support for export activities, notably those of a non-
traditional nature. Closing the fiscal gap entails support for increasing government
revenue and improving expenditure management, which is the more delicate task
since donors and recipient governments have to carefully balance the disadvantage
of lower-than-needed government spending against the disadvantage of higher, and
potentially distortionary, taxation.
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1. Introduction
Foreign aid is intended to have beneficial macroeconomic effects, most
notably to raise a country’s economic growth rate. The traditional rationale
for this view has been that aid can fill the savings and trade gaps, as shown
by the two-gap model which we discuss in Section 2. However, the debate
over gap models clearly illustrates that the macroeconomic role and effect of
aid are considerably more complicated than is presumed in the gap literature.
Some of these complications are discussed in Section 3, namely: (i) the
effects of foreign aid on government fiscal behaviour (including the tax effort
of the receiving government and the fungibility of aid), (ii) the possibility of
debt problems and (iii) the relationship between foreign aid and the exchange
rate (Dutch disease). These various contributions seek to show that aid may
do much more than merely fill gaps - and this in ways not explicitly
accounted for in the gap literature. However, a major argument of this paper
is that aid should not be used simply to temporarily fill gaps, but given in
such a way that the gaps will close over time so that a country’s growth may
then be sustained without aid. In Section 4 we discuss how aid may be used
to close both the external and fiscal gaps, considering both macro-level
interventions and project-level interventions. Section 5 concludes.
2. The macroeconomic rationale for foreign aid
The gap-models of the 1950s and 1960s had in common the Harrod-Domar
tradition of stressing physical capital formation as a central driving force of
economic growth. In the Harrod-Domar model output depends upon the
investment rate, and on the productivity of that investment. Investment is
financed by savings, and in an open economy total savings equal the sum of
domestic and foreign savings. A savings gap is said to arise if domestic
savings alone are insufficient to finance the investment required to attain a
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target rate of growth (e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan 1961 and Fei and Paauw 1965).
It should be stressed that the idea of a gap only makes sense given an
exogenously determined target growth rate. A distinction is thus made
between the ex ante savings gap (the difference between desired investment
and domestic savings) and the ex post savings gap (the difference between
actual investment and domestic savings).
In addition to the savings gap there is also a trade gap, which is based on the
further assumption that not all investment goods can be produced domesti-
cally. Hence a certain level of imports is required to attain desired investment
(i.e. once again the investment required to achieve the target growth rate).
The import bill is financed either from export earnings or foreign capital
inflows (e.g. aid). If exports are not sufficient to cover the whole bill the
availability of foreign exchange (forex) to purchase imported capital goods
(rather than the supply of domestic savings) may become the binding con-
straint on growth. Hence, there is binding trade gap, also called the foreign
exchange (forex) gap. Once again a distinction is made between the ex ante
trade gap (the difference between desired imports and exports) and the ex post
gap (the difference between actual imports and exports). Critics of the
approach argue that this difference between ex ante and ex post could only
emerge if markets were suppressed through fixed exchange rates regime: if
exchange rates are flexible then there can be no gap. But this argument misses
the point that the gap has to be defined with reference to a target growth rate,
in which case a gap may be present even if there markets are liberalised
(though the “gap” may be less if controls held back exports). The trade gap
formed the basis of work carried out by the UN in the 1950s (and was
sometimes called the Prebisch gap).
The two gaps are combined in the two-gap model, put forward by Chenery
and Strout (1966). Growth will be constrained by the larger of the two ex ante
1
 This fact of course requires some adjustment in the model variables. Chenery and
Strout assumed that there would be additional consumption if the savings gap is
over-filled and additional imports if the forex gap is over-filled.
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gaps. If aid is insufficient to fill the larger of these gaps the desired growth
rate cannot be attained. That is, the gaps are not additive: aid simultaneously
fills both gaps (by paying for imported capital equipment a single aid dollar
relaxes both the savings and the forex constraint). If the larger gap is filled
then the non-binding gap is “over-filled” (the ex post gap exceeds the ex ante
one).1
The traditional two-gap model sees imports as aiding capital accumulation,
whereas more recent statements of the three-gap model (see below) reflect the
fact that output may be constrained by low capacity utilization due to lack of
spares and intermediate goods rather than lack of investments (e.g. Nalo
1993, Ndulu 1991, Shaaeldin 1988 and the country studies in Taylor 1993).
These models thus disaggregate imports, so that import composition matters
as well as the level of imports.
Chenery and Strout also raised the possibility that there would be a skills gap
at early levels of development, whereby a lack of technical expertise would
constrain the level of investment which could be attained. Over the years a
number of other gaps have been proposed, such as the technology gap, the
food gap, the gender gap and the environment gap. More narrowly related to
the tradition of the two-gap model have been recent concerns over a third
“fiscal” gap between government revenue and expenditures, as illustrated by
the three-gap models by Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1991, 1993). Although the
fiscal gap is a subset of the savings gap, the former may be the binding
constraint if there is some limit on public spending (say, through a borrowing
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target) and private investment is linked to public investment through a
crowding in (or out) relationship. 
As noted, an important aspect of the fiscal gap relates to capacity utilization.
In the literature, capacity utilization, i.e. the extent to which new and existing
productive capacities (the legacy of past investments) are utilized, has been
found to be of major importance for growth in developing countries (see the
studies cited above). Government efforts to increase capacity utilization are
thus important, and involves spending on infrastructure, education, health
services etc. Curbing these efforts to increase capacity utilization can occur
when government resources for investment and imports are insufficient, inter
alia, as a result of large public debt service; indeed, evidence is available
suggesting that government expenditure in the sub-Saharan African region
has been curtailed by foreign debt service (e.g. Fielding 1997, Gallagher 1994
and Sahn 1992, 1990). The closing of this fiscal gap could thus be facilitated
by external resources directed to the government budget.
In sum, the gap models predict a positive role for foreign aid whereby it
supplements domestic savings, export earnings and government revenue,
hence increasing, investment, imports and government expenditure, and
thereby growth. However, the empirical record of aid seems rather more
mixed, and a number of macroeconomic complications have been advanced
in the literature to explain why there is no one-for-one relationship between
aid and economic performance. In the next section we discuss three such
areas: (i) government fiscal behaviour, (ii) foreign debt problems associated
with the loan-component of aid and (iii) the relationship between foreign aid
and the currency exchange rate of the aid recipient.
3. Macroeconomic complications in foreign aid
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To analyse aid’s macroeconomic impact we need to study aggregates such as
growth, output, investment, savings etc. with aid, and compare them with
what they would have been without aid. It may seem that such an analysis
need simply (i) classify aid in various ways - for example, as being for
investment or consumption, types of government expenditure supported and
imports versus local costs - and then (ii) add these aid amounts to the amount
which originate from domestic resources (and non-aid capital inflows). This
is the approach inherent in the two-gap model. Yet, such analysis is not
satisfactory since it is based on the assumption that domestic savings,
government expenditure and revenue, foreign borrowing, the exchange rate
etc. are not affected by aid inflows. We illustrate below how some of these
economic complications may interfere with the simple aid-growth
relationship in the two-gap model.
AID AND GOVERNMENT FISCAL BEHAVIOUR
An important complicating factor, which has not been explicitly accounted
for in the gap literature, is the fiscal behaviour of governments which receive
foreign aid. It is, in particular, of considerable interest to understand how aid
inflows affect government expenditure and financing patterns. This is so since
the aid recipient may of course have other objectives than the aid donor. Two
distinct, but inter-related strands of the development literature have attempted
to deal with these issues, both having the concept of aid fungibility as a
central issue. The first approach is explicitly concerned with the fungibility
of aid as regards government spending patterns. The other, so-called ‘fiscal
response’ literature, adopts a more theoretical approach and attempts to
analyse how aid impacts on various categories of expenditures and financing
sources (including taxes). Both approaches form the broader context in which
government behaviour vis-à-vis foreign aid is analysed (McGillivray and
Morrissey 1999a).
2
 Thus if the donor does not specify the use of funds it makes no sense to talk of
fungibility. Programme aid funds (discussed in Mosley and Eeckhout 2000) are often
called “very fungible”, but that is a mis-use of the term since there are no conditions
as to what these funds should be used for. Aid which has no designated purpose is
best referred to as free resources. Aid which does have a designated purpose is
effectively free resources if it is fungible.
3
 White (1998) elaborates this definition by distinguishing between aggregate and
categorical fungibility. The former is where the aggregate category (say, imports or
government expenditure) does not rise in a one-for-one manner with an aid flow
whose intended purpose is to increase that aggregate. Categorical fungibility occurs
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The fungibility of aid. The traditional fungibility argument - not conceived
within the fiscal response literature - was first advanced by Singer (1965). He
argued that aid’s impact should not be evaluated against the projects said to
be ‘aid-financed’. His point may be illustrated as follows. Suppose a
government has $100 million to be allocated between two activities (both
costing exactly $100 million): rehabilitating rural health clinics or buying
some military hardware (say, nice shiny tanks). After some deliberation the
government decides to prioritise the health clinics. Subsequently a donor
offers the government $100 million for any development project. Clearly the
tanks are not eligible for donor finance, but the health clinics are. So the
government may ask the donor to finance the latter, freeing up its own
resources to buy the tanks. The actual impact of the aid (a comparison of with
versus without) is therefore to increase military rather than health expenditure
(Table 1). No diversion of funds is involved, but funding an activity that
would have happened in the absence of aid frees up resources to be used
elsewhere. It is this marginal expenditure which is effectively related with the
impact of the aid.2
 Fungibility among different types of expenditure is
therefore observed when the item for which aid is intended does not rise by
exactly the amount of the aid inflow.3 It is obvious that if the government
if the inflow increases any expenditure item within the aggregate other than those
intended by the donor.
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initially intended to buy military equipment, aid will clearly be beneficial, and
there are in any case limits to fungibility, as discussed below.
Table 1: Expenditure patterns with and without aid.
Health expenditure
(rural health clinics)
Military expenditure
(tanks)
Without aid 100 0
With aid 100 100
The fungibility problem can also be illustrated using the more narrow concept
of fungibility inherent in the analysis by Griffin (1970). He looked at the
relationship between aid and domestic savings. Accordingly, Figures 1 and
2 illustrate inter-temporal consumption decisions with and without aid.
Income may be consumed in the current period (Ct) or saved, invested and
consumed in the next period (Ct+1). Future consumption will be (1+r) times
the value of savings in time t (r being the return on capital). For a given level
of income in Figure 1 the budget constraint is KL, and assuming standard
preferences, the consumption bundle is at point P, with domestic savings of
L-Ct1.
Now suppose there is an aid inflow of value A, equal to LN. This shifts the
budget constraint out to MN. In the two-gap model, there is no fungibility.
Thus, it is assumed that aid is used to increase investment only, so
consumption in period t remains unchanged at point P . In contrast, it can be
argued as done by Griffin that aid will in reality be treated like any other
income and shared between consumption and savings according to their
respective marginal propensities. This would move consumption in period t
4
 See White (1998) for further critiques.
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Figure 1: Griffin’s analysis of aid and savings.
to point Q, and domestic savings fall to L-Ct2. As such there is no longer a
one-to-one relationship between aid and savings--investment; aid is fungible.
One underlying assumption behind the above argument is that it treats aid as
a free resource (i.e. as part of income) which may be allocated exactly as the
recipient wishes.4 Assume instead the donor directs the aid towards
investment in such a way that the budget constraint with aid changes from
being MN in Figure 1 to MNL as shown in Figure 2. From Figure 2 it follows
that aid remains fungible as long as the preferred consumption bundle lies
along MN. Yet, if preferences dictate that a point to the right of N should be
chosen this is no longer feasible. In this case, aid fungibility is limited. Such
situations appear, ceteris paribus, when aid finance is large relative to
domestic resources, or if few resources would be devoted to investment in the
absence of aid. At the limit, assuming L is chosen without aid, there are no
5
 Figure 2 may be adapted to analyse other allocations: for example developmental
government expenditure on the vertical axis and other expenditures on the
horizontal, or capital and intermediate imports and consumer imports respectively.
The same argument regarding the limits of fungibility will apply in these cases.
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Figure 2: The kinked budget constraint.
domestic savings. In this case, aid geared at investment will result in a one-to-
one increase in investment, i.e. there is no fungibility. This also illustrates that
aid will tend to be fungible if it is allocated to a use to which the recipient
accords high priority.5
In sum, it is clear that the fungibility of aid is an important issue in
understanding how aid impacts on government behaviour and growth in aid
receiving countries (see Feyzioglu et al. 1998 and Pack and Pack 1993 for
recent studies). It should be highlighted, however, that fungibility may not
6
  Including aid as an endogenous variable is based on the premise that, once donors
have committed the aid money, recipients can in practice determine actual
disbursements (total and among different expenditure types).
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necessarily be a problem. If the aid recipient has more knowledge about how
to maximise the impact of aid, then fungibility may in fact be growth-
enhancing, assuming, of course, that the aid recipient pursues growth and
development objectives in an effective manner. Thus, whether fungibility
should be seen as positive or negative feature of aid depends upon country-
specific circumstances and the interplay between donor and aid recipient
objectives.
Fiscal response models. The fiscal response literature relies on more formal
modelling to identify how aid inflows may result in government behaviour
that undermines the intended growth effects of aid (McGillivray and
Morrissey 1999b). A number of studies on this subject has appeared
following the seminal paper by Heller (1975), including Mosley et al. (1987),
Gang and Khan (1991), Binh and McGillivray (1993) and White (1993). The
standard point of departure is a government utility function, where targets
have been set for expenditure types (e.g. recurrent and capital), revenue (tax
and non-tax) and borrowing (domestic and foreign). The government tries to
maximise the utility function by attaining these targets, subject to a budget
constraint in which aid inflows have traditionally been included as an
exogenous variable (on the ground that aid levels are supply determined).
Recent specifications of the utility function include aid as an endogenous
variable (e.g. Franco-Rodriguez et al. 1998 and McGillivray and Morrissey
1999b).6
 Estimation of the model is performed after deriving reduced form
equations for each endogenous variable. 
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Recent empirical evidence for Pakistan generated along these lines indicates
that foreign aid has led to somewhat higher capital expenditures
(investments), markedly lower recurrent expenditures (consumption), and a
markedly lower tax effort during the 1965-95 period (Franco-Rodriguez et al.
1998) than would have been the case without aid. This result appears also to
be characteristic in a number of other studies (McGillivray 1999), implying
that the aid-investment link is firm. In contrast, the World Bank (1998) puts
more emphasis on the potential consumption enhancing effects of aid.
Turning to the lower tax effort of aid recipients, this may be seen as an
undesirable consequence of aid, though some may point to the removal of the
distortionary effects of taxation, or argue that this is a channel for global
redistribution from developed country tax payers to developing country ones.
Aid may either increase or decrease the budget deficit, or even leave it
unchanged, depending on the difference between incremental expenditures
and revenue. In theory, the deficit may increase if the government has to
commit its own additional resources to complement project aid or if tax
revenue fall sharply. On the other hand, programme aid, the local currency
countervalue of which is often not tied to any particular expenditure, can
reduce the deficit (for evidence of which, see White 1999a).
In spite of the insights gained from fiscal response models, a number of
theoretical and methodological problems limit the scope for clear-cut
conclusions about the fiscal behaviour of governments vis-à-vis the aid-
growth link, as discussed in more detail in McGillivray and Morrissey
(1999b) and White (1994, 1992). Important among these are the estimation
problems that arise from inadequate data. More important, these models do
not specifically link the fiscal effects of aid to growth, or macroeconomic
aggregates more generally. This implies, inter alia, that the impact on savings
and taxes, transmitted through the feedback effects of aid on current and
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future income, are not accounted for even though they may be of real
significance (White 1993). Only indirect inferences can therefore be made
about how government fiscal behaviour affects the aid-growth relationship,
and thus how donor policy can be designed or redesigned so as to maximise
aid’s growth potential. As noted by McGillivray and Morrissey (1999b), this
points to a combination of (preferably country-specific) growth and fiscal
response theory as an avenue of future research.
AID AND FOREIGN DEBT
Gap-models provide a macroeconomic rationale for foreign aid when there
is deficiency in domestic savings, foreign exchange or government revenue.
Focus is on closing these gaps through external resources, and no distinction
is usually made between aid grants, aid loans and other flows. If, however,
resource gaps are closed through debt-creating flows, problems may arise
because of the cost difference to the recipient in the form of future
repayments. This may have adverse implications for the savings, forex and
fiscal gaps in the longer term, and for macroeconomic performance more
generally. Two types of debt problems have occupied debt analysts in this
regard. One relates to debt capacity problems, involving a disruption of
normal debtor-creditor relations in which the debtor is unable (or unwilling)
to honour debt service obligations as they come due. Tangible evidence of
such problems occurs when payment arrears accumulate and debt is
rescheduled or forgiven. The other problem is that which occurs when a
country’s foreign debt is so large as to adversely affect economic
development (regardless of whether it is serviced in full or not). This problem
is less easily distinguished, since economic development is influenced by a
host of other factors besides foreign debt. The two problems are considered
in turn.
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Debt capacity problems. The concept of debt capacity has provided an
analytical framework within which the foreign debt of developing countries
has most commonly been assessed. Three different approaches to the analysis
of debt capacity can be found in the literature, each pointing to different
“locations” within the macroeconomy to look for explanations of debt service
problems. The first approach evolves around the “growth-cum-debt”
literature, where emphasis is on analysing whether foreign borrowing is
adequately supported by output growth. The second approach of “debt dyna-
mics” deals with the external solvency issue of foreign debt, and attention is
directed towards the external performance of the economy in relation to the
cost of borrowing. The third approach, of more recent interest and concern,
may be called the “fiscal dimension” of foreign debt, and focus is on the debt
burden of the public sector vis-à-vis public revenue.
Growth-cum-debt models consider debt capacity in terms of the benefits and
costs of foreign resources in the process of economic growth (e.g. Avramovic
et al. 1964, Hernandez-Cata 1988, Greene and Khan 1990 and the survey by
McDonald 1982). The argument is that debt capacity can be maintained,
provided that additions to foreign debt over time contribute sufficiently to
growth, suggesting a virtual race between growth and debt as a possible
development path. The basic idea is that the behaviour of international
financial resources may change in different stages of what is called the “debt
cycle”, and that these changes are closely linked to the course of economic
development. As development proceeds, changes in domestic income, rates
of savings, accumulation of capital stock, and rates of return on investment
can be expected to alter the volume and direction of financial resources.
Hence, over time, countries are expected to move through a number of forma-
lised balance-of-payments and debt stages, moving from a debtor position to
that of the creditor (see Avramovic et al. 1964).
7
 For instance, in the aggregate, the return on investment projects, measured by the
marginal product of capital, must be higher than the international interest rate. Also,
ploughed-back profits must be high enough so that private savings in time rise over
and above investment. Alternatively (or supplementary), government savings must
rise, i.e. fiscal deficits must be reduced. This in turn will leave a resource surplus
which can be used to meet debt service. The crucial factor in this regard is what is
happening to the savings ratio. If the marginal propensity to save exceeds the
average, the savings ratio will rise. Otherwise, savings behavior may impede on the
completion of the debt cycle. The volume of investments (meeting the first condi-
tion) must also be adequate so as to enable total output and income to grow at a
satisfactory rate. A high income growth rate would also have the effect of encoura-
ging the fulfilment of condition two. Furthermore, continued external finance must
be available, in principle regardless of how debt service is managed, but this requires
that borrowing countries handle their external accounts in a way that allows them
continuously to service obligations due. Ways must also be found so as to moderate
fluctuations in export earnings of borrowing countries. It is clear that for a country
to maintain debt capacity and complete the debt cycle, it will have to keep a close
eye on all the variables that determine whether the above conditions are met or not.
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There is no automaticity in this process, however. Progression through the
debt cycle requires that a number of conditions be met.7 Often, since these
conditions are seen as important only insofar as they support the number one
condition of a satisfactory level of economic growth, they have been
submerged into one single condition expressed within the context of the
Harrod-Domar model. The condition states that (over time) the growth rate
of output should exceed (or at least equal) the rate of interest. In this context,
debt capacity is viewed in terms of the ease with which a country can
reconcile competing claims on domestic resources, i.e. demands for increased
domestic absorption and the financial obligations abroad. Reconciliation of
such competing claims are of course easier when resources are growing. For
as long as debt payments require only part of the increment in income, it is
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possible that consumption and investment can grow along with debt service.
A borrowing strategy based on the principles of growth-cum-debt will thus
only work if there is economic growth. Considering, however, the growth
experience of many indebted developing countries over the past decades, it
is clear that economic growth has generally not been impressive, and in many
cases certainly not sufficient to support growing debt obligations (Tarp 1994
and Hjertholm 1991). 
Despite the merits of the above approach, preservation of debt capacity
requires more than growth (even if it is high). Since foreign borrowing is con-
ducted in foreign exchange, the savings surplus has to be converted into
foreign exchange in order to effect the transfer of debt payments. Growth is
therefore only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for maintaining debt
capacity. Debt dynamics models directly address the issue of a borrowing
country’s external solvency (e.g. Cooper and Sachs 1985, Simonsen 1985 and
World Bank 1985). Since debt is serviced in foreign currency, the value of
exports gives a more accurate impression of income than for example GDP as
it relates more directly to debt servicing ability. Accordingly, of key interest
is export performance relative to the cost of borrowing. To maintain debt
capacity, the rate of growth of exports must exceed (or at least equal) the rate
of interest. When exports grow faster than debt, the borrowing country does
not have to contribute any of its domestic resources when servicing debt. The
debt dynamics approach stresses the need for adjustments in the trade balance
in order to maintain debt capacity, and it suggests that solvency might be
endangered if exports does not grow commensurately with debt obligations.
Observing the generally poor export record of indebted developing countries
since the late 1970s therefore suggests another reason (besides low output
growth) for the emergence of debt problems (Tarp 1994).
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When analysing debt capacity, the debt dynamics model has one important
shortcoming, however, stemming from its exclusive focus on the balance-of-
payments, thereby largely ignoring internal constraints on debt capacity. In
poor countries these constraints can be of a structural nature, related to e.g.
the import and agricultural dependence of these countries, or they can be of
a sectoral nature, related to e.g. the dichotomy between private assets and
public liabilities in countries with predominantly public debts (i.e. the internal
transfer problem as discussed below). Even so, the response of the
international financial community to the debt crisis has commonly been cast
in an aggregate context in which debt capacity is understood as primarily a
balance-of-payments issue. For this reason, a prominent element of past debt
strategies, besides increased financing and selective debt relief, has been to
promote adjustments that would bring about an increase in foreign exchange,
and thus in the ability to effect the external transfer of debt service. 
At the heart of the debt capacity of the public sector is what has become
known as the ‘internal transfer problem’. One early theoretical formulation
of the fiscal dimension involved in foreign debt is found in Kharas (1981a,
1981b, 1981c). Kharas considered the problems facing a government engaged
in foreign borrowing to finance public expenditures, and which is constrained
in its ability to collect revenue to service the acquired debt. If the government
uses most of the borrowed funds for investments in such areas as
infrastructure, education, health services, etc., the sustainable level of debt
that the government can take on will depend, not only on the relationship
between the marginal social return on these investments and the marginal cost
of borrowing, but also on the governments ability to appropriate sufficient
domestic resources for debt service. Debt capacity thus also requires an
expanding tax base. The fiscal source of debt service problems is thus evident
8
 An important point to emerge from this line of argument, and one that departs from
conventional debt capacity analysis, is that the critical link between debt service and
government taxation makes it possible for debt problems to occur even if all inflows
of foreign resources are used for investment, and if the marginal product of capital
is greater than the real rate of interest.
9
 Analysis of the fiscal dimension of foreign debt in developing countries can also
be found in Bevilaqua (1994) and Dittus (1989).
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if taxation is not expanded commensurately with maturing public debt service
obligations.8
Reisen and van Trotsenburg (1988) empirically analysed the internal transfer
problem in the wider context of the theory of international transfers. They
uncovered that the fiscal transfer problem had been one of the main obstacles
to a return to international creditworthiness for most of the major
(commercial) debtors in the first half of the 1980s. This result suggested that
the fiscal burden of debt exacerbated debt capacity problems and helped
explain why earlier projections, by e.g. Cline (1983), of the anticipated return
to creditworthiness could not be realized, despite achievement of projected
improvements in industrial country growth and reductions in LIBOR. With
respect to the indebted low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, a recent
study by Hjertholm (1997) similarly found that fiscal debt burden indicators
played a significant role in explaining the poor debt servicing performance of
a large number of sub-Saharan countries. This suggests that the issue of debt
service capacity cannot be separated from the issue of the government budget
constraint.9
Foreign debt and economic development. That there is a close link between
large foreign debt burdens and economic development is strongly indicated
by the empirical evidence, which have generated a fairly robust statistical
10
 As a result of higher debt burdens, uncertainty about international creditworthiness
may also entail restrictions on access to international capital markets. However,
since most of the poorest indebted countries do not have access to these markets in
the first place, this effect is of less relevance, and will therefore not be discussed
further. Moreover, such capital inflows are in a sense a measure of the liquidity
constraint, which is essentially also captured through the crowding-out and import
compression effects.
11
 See Hirschman (1967), Díaz-Alejandro (1981) and Taylor (1983) for such ideas.
Also, as the only or at least the most basic, supplier of health, education, and water
services to middle- and low-income households (Green 1994), the governments of
poor countries affect the accumulation of human capital and thereby long-run output
growth, as stressed by endogenous growth models.
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relationship between high foreign debt burdens and poor economic
performance (e.g. Cohen 1996, Ojo and Oshikoya 1995, Oshikoya 1994, Salih
1994, Ukpolo 1992 and Mbaku 1991). However, by analysing debt and
economic performance in an aggregate context, this literature has tended to
leave potential fiscal problems unattended. This analytical limitation may be
particularly problematic in case of the poorest debtor countries, where the
fragile budgetary stance of governments may entail more difficult fiscal
policy tradeoffs than elsewhere. In the following, a number of possible
channels that can transmit the effects of the fiscal burden of debt on economic
performance will be examined. They include (i) cash-flow effects stemming
from public expenditure crowding-out and from import compression and (ii)
disincentives associated with a large debt overhang.10
There is a well-established notion that public expenditures may have
significant complimentary effects on private investment, a notion fuelled by
the idea that growth in poor countries can be impeded by structural
bottlenecks, which (as a rule) only the government can remedy, through e.g.
investments in infrastructure.11 The generally inferior state of infrastructural,
12
 See Hadjimichael and Ghura (1995), Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Bairam (1990)
and the country studies in Taylor (1993).
13
 Since some substitution away from imports may take place, the decline in
investment will probably be proportionally less than the decline in imports. And yet,
the remarkable stability of the relationship between real capital imports and real
investments observed in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, suggests that the fixed
proportional relationship is not that far off, and the imperfect substitution
phenomenon is indeed partly responsible for the import compression observed in this
region.
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educational and health facilities in poor countries thus provides considerable
scope for utilizing the positive externalities associated with government
expenditures.12 However, to the extent that such expenditures are crowded out
by public debt service, these poor countries will miss out on these
complementarity effects, and thereby experience lower levels of private
investment and growth than would otherwise be possible. As noted earlier,
evidence is available to suggest that government expenditures in sub-Saharan
African countries has indeed been squeezed by public debt service (Fielding
1997, Gallagher 1994 and Sahn 1992, 1990).
A closely related cash-flow problem associated with public debt service is
import compression. As noted by Ndulu (1991), import compression can
occur for two reasons. First, if the ability of the economy to substitute
between imported and home produced capital goods is limited, a cut in capital
goods imports will lead to a decline in investment activity and growth.13
Second, following Hemphill (1974) and Moran (1990), import compression
can occur in cases where import volumes are determined by import capacity
rather than relative prices. And since the two main sources of import capacity
are exports and foreign savings (and given the meagre export performance of
14
 See, e.g. Baban and Greene (1992), Svedberg (1991) and Rosen and Shapouri
(1989).
15
 Early contributions include studies by Krugman (1987, 1985), Sachs (1986, 1984),
and Dooley (1986). An early literature review can be found in Froot and Krugman
(1990), while Claessens et al. (1996) and Cline (1995) offer more up-dated reviews
of the literature.
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poor indebted countries since the early 1980s),14 it is clear that the magnitude
of debt service will matter greatly for import capacity, through its reduction
of foreign savings. Import compression occurs both at the balance-of-
payments level and at the budgetary level (i.e. the effect of public debt service
on the import-content of government expenditure). Reductions in the import
capacity of the government, as a result of debt service, can thus reduce
government investment activity, whereby the complementarity effects
mentioned are involuntarily sacrificed, with adverse effects on private
investment. That such cash-flow effects have indeed been at work in poor
indebted countries is confirmed (for 20 sub-Saharan African countries) by the
empirical study by Hjertholm (1997).
There is an important additional mechanism through which economic
performance can be adversely affected by public debt. Domestic (and foreign)
investors will need assurance that their expected return will in fact be
realised, and will thus keep an eye on developments in a number of key
factors, which are believed to be of importance for the incentive to invest.
The extent to which an “overhang” of public debt can affect this “incentive
structure” has generated a notable literature of its own.15
 Debt overhang
effects come in two varieties. The first stresses the tax disincentives
associated with high debt burdens. This is the “narrow” variety usually found
in the literature. The other variety extends the disincentive phenomenon to
include broad measures of macroeconomic instability. 
16
 See Borensztein (1990b), Sachs (1990, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d, 1988), Diwan
and Claessens (1989), Kenen (1989), Krugman (1989a, 1989b, 1988), Dornbusch
(1988) and Sachs and Huizinga (1987).
17
 For this to happen, it has been shown that the debtor country must be on the
“wrong” side of the so-called debt relief Laffer curve (see Krugman 1989a, Sachs
1989c and Froot 1989). Indeed, as noted by Krugman (1989a: 265), ‘arguments that
debt relief is in everyone’s interest are, in effect, arguments that countries are on the
wrong side of the debt relief Laffer curve.’
18
 Dooley (1989), building on the exposition by Froot (1989), shows that relieving
a debtor country’s debt overhang can provide investment incentives, not only to
residents of the debtor country, but also to international investors.
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The fundamental notion of the narrow debt overhang theory is that the future
debt service burden of a country with an exhausted capacity to service debt
is likely to weigh heavily on the increase in the country’s future economic
output. Part of any future increase in output will thus go to foreign creditors.
This will be perceived domestically as akin to a “tax” on investment returns,
which in turn will act to discourage investors (Borensztein 1990a). On these
grounds, the case has been made for debt reductions since it will improve
investment incentives.16 From the perspective of commercial creditors, if the
incentive effect is strong enough the repayment prospects of the remaining
debt increases.17 As such, debt stock reduction may benefit debtors and
creditors alike, and may thus be described as an efficient “market-based” debt
reduction (Krugman 1989a and Sachs 1989d).18
Contesting this optimism regarding debt relief effects, Diwan and Rodrik
(1992) argue that the existence of strong incentive effects is debatable, inter
alia because debt payments in the area of 2-5 per cent of GDP (roughly
translating into a 2-5 per cent marginal tax) appear too small to constitute a
serious disincentive to private investment in the first place. However, given
19
 According to World Bank data for 1993, of 37 sub-Saharan countries, 20 achieved
revenue/GDP ratios well below 20 per cent, another ten between 20 and 30 per cent,
and in fact only seven countries were able to achieve revenue/GDP ratios of 30 per
cent or higher.
20
 Among the studies that have found empirical support for the (narrow) debt
overhang theory are Servén and Solimano (1993, 1992), Perasso (1992), Savvides
(1992), Greene and Villanueva (1990), Borensztein (1990b), Faini and de Melo
(1990), Fry (1989), IMF (1989: 45-67) and Aghevli et al. (1990). Studies that tend
to reject the debt overhang hypothesis include Levy and Chowdhury (1993),
Claessens, Oks and van Wijnbergen (1993), Warner (1993, 1992), and Hofman and
Reisen (1990, 1991).
-24-
the predominance of public debt in poor countries, disincentives would
mainly be related to investments under the control or influence of the
government, notably through its tax policies, and the fiscal burden of debt
service may therefore imply a relatively high marginal tax burden vis-à-vis
investors. Also, while a comparison between a debt service transfer of, say,
2 per cent of GDP and a tax revenue ratio of 25-30 per cent (which is about the
developing country average) does indeed suggest only a moderate drain of
fiscal accounts, it must be kept in mind that tax revenue ratios in the poorest
countries are often far below this average.19 In many poor countries, even a
debt service burden of only 2 per cent of GDP may thus still impose problems
at the fiscal level. This discussion aside, while the debt overhang theory
appears to offer a good (but still partial) explanation of the dismal investment
performance of poor indebted countries, nevertheless, the general state of the
empirical evidence appears inconclusive.20
Besides the possibility of disincentives working through taxation, there is the
possibility of disincentives working through general macroeconomic
instability. The importance of macro stability, characterized for instance by
21
 For evidence on sub-Saharan Africa, see Schmidt-Hebbel (1995), Hadjimichael
et al. (1995) and Hadjimichael and Ghura (1995).
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low and predictable inflation rates and stable exchange rates, lies in the
inborn signals about the direction and credibility of government policies that
are send to private agents. The element of certainty conveyed by such stability
is enabling for investment planning and decisionmaking. Since many forms
of investments are not necessarily characterized by the sort of smooth
production functions assumed by neoclassical theory, but rather by
irreversibility (capital goods are not very mobile once installed) and high
initial lump-sum costs (Pindyck 1988 and Tornell 1989), investment decisions
of a forward-looking nature can easily be put off if instability is on the rise.
The empirical evidence tends to support the idea of a link between investment
and the policy uncertainties accompanying macro instability (Servén and
Solimano 1993, Fischer 1993, Blejer and Ize 1989 and Rodrik 1991).21
The impact of a public debt overhang on macro stability can occur through
several channels. Public debt can increase the overall fiscal deficit directly by
increasing debt service payments. It can lead to exchange rate depreciation,
for balance-of-payments reasons, whereby the fiscal deficit widens because
the home currency value of public debt service may increase relatively to
public revenue. Moreover, an increase in the part of the fiscal deficit that is
monetized (e.g. through higher government credits), can lead to monetary
expansion and inflation. Finally, recourse to exceptional financing, such as
payment arrears and rescheduling of debt payments tends to maintain
uncertainty about the future debt servicing profile of the public sector, while
at the same time absorbing much of the scarce analytical and policymaking
capacity of the government for debt management, as well as disrupting
ordinary trade flows. Quite apart from their equilibrium levels, public debt-
induced fluctuations in such macro indicators as inflation, exchange rates, and
22
 The study by Hjertholm (1997) for sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, while not
generating strong evidence for the narrow debt overhang hypothesis, showed clear
evidence of the “extended” version, in that public debt burdens had several (indirect)
effects that were transmitted through macroeconomic variables, such as inflation,
exchange rates and exceptional financing.
23
 In the seventies, after substantial natural gas reserves had been discovered in the
sixties, the ensuing export boom and balance-of-payments surplus promised
increased welfare for all Dutch. Instead, the seventies saw a Dutch economy
suffering from rising inflation, falling manufactured exports, lower growth rates and
rising unemployment (Gillis et al. 1996).
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exceptional financing may thus signal fiscal distress and an inadequate ability
on the part of the government to control fiscal events. Such signals may in
turn heighten investor uncertainty about the future direction of the
macroeconomy and thus reduce the incentive to invest. In sum, the
“extended” debt overhang hypothesis asserts, and available evidence appears
confirmative, that one or more of the macro stability indicators discussed are
likely to capture part of the investment disincentives of a foreign debt
burden.22
AID AND THE EXCHANGE RATE
A third complicating area of concern in analysing the macroeconomic impact
of foreign aid has been the effect of aid on the exchange rate of the recipient
country, and thus on the general competitive stance of the export sector.
Originally observed in connection with booming primary exports, this
phenomenon has been labelled ‘Dutch disease’, deriving its name from the
unhappy experience of the Netherlands after the discovery of major natural
gas reserves in the sixties.23 Since then, examples of the syndrome include
Zambia (copper), treated in Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1990) and what Gillis et al.
24
 There are also cases where the export booms have not led to Dutch disease
problems, notably diamonds in Botswana (Hill 1991) and oil in Iran (Majd 1989).
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(1996: 479) has labelled ‘a bad case of Dutch disease’, namely the case of the
oil boom in Nigeria (treated in, e.g. Bienen 1988 and Nyatepe-Coo 1994).24
Dutch disease effects associated with booming exports were originally
analysed by Corden and Neary (1982) and Michaley (1981), van Wijnbergen
(1986) and recently Rattsø and Torvik (1999) have formulated theoretical
models of aid-induced Dutch disease effects.
The Dutch disease phenomenon basically describes a situation where an
inflow of foreign exchange in any form (i.e. from export earnings, private
capital flows or foreign aid) puts upward pressure on the real exchange rate
of the recipient country by stimulating more rapid domestic inflation. A large
inflow of foreign aid may therefore result in a loss of competitiveness of
exports, counteracting other efforts to increase exports.
The inflationary effects of foreign aid, however, may to some extent be
mitigated by the inflow of foreign commodities purchased by foreign aid. Aid
that increases the supply of commodities in general or eases supply
bottlenecks in the economy, can be assumed to have a deflationary impact,
which may or may not exceed the upward pressure on the real exchange rate
as a result of the aid. Furthermore, an inflow of aid may raise the productivity
of the traded-goods sector - for example, by lowering transport costs or
raising the educational level. Aid which increases overall productivity in the
traded-goods sector serves to improve international competitiveness, i.e. to
increase the supply of traded goods at any given price (determined by world
market prices, if the country is a price taker).
25
 A study testing the Dutch disease hypothesis in the context of the 1976-7 Tanzania
coffee boom similarly did not find supportive evidence (Musonda and Luvanda
1991), and neither did a similar study of the Dutch disease effects of the 1976-9
coffee boom in Kenya (Bevan et al. 1992).
26
 Furthermore, by financing an exchange rate anchor aid has an anti-inflationary
effect.
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Since there are counteracting effects, it is not possible a priori to determine
what effects an increase in foreign aid will have on the recipient country’s
exchange rate, and hence, on the competitiveness of its exports. This is an
empirical matter. The study by van Wijnbergen (1985), for instance, of six
sub-Saharan African countries, to some extent confirms the hypothesis that
increases in the volume of foreign aid can cause an appreciation of the real
exchange rate in recipient countries, as did the study by White and Wignaraja
(1992) of Sri Lanka. A study on Ghana similarly found that Dutch disease
effects had posed problems for macroeconomic management in the eighties
(Younger 1992). Evidence for Tanzania, on the other hand, suggests that
foreign aid inflows had caused a real depreciation, a result that runs contrary
to the Dutch disease hypothesis (Nyoni 1998).25 There are several ways in
which aid may support exchange rate depreciation, mainly through support
for a change in exchange rate regime through policy dialogue and the
provision of aid funds to support the more liberalised regime (see White
1999a, 1999b).26
However, in countries where foreign aid plays an important role in covering
external deficits, there is good reason to be aware of the dangers of an aid-
induced real appreciation of the rate of exchange. It remains, however, more
a question of appropriate management of the inflow of foreign exchange; it
is clear that the release of foreign exchange into the domestic economy needs
to be in accordance with the absorptive capacity of the economy. 
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3. Foreign aid for gap closing
It follows from the above review that the macroeconomic channels through
which aid impacts on macroeconomic performance are complex, not to
mention the further complicating issues that arise from the political economy
of recipient countries (see, e.g. Kanbur 2000 on the situation in Africa).
Looking ahead, we would argue that it is equally important to understand how
aid can help close resource gaps in the long run, rather than merely filling
these gaps in the immediate future. While foreign aid may well be needed for
a considerable amount of time to help finance investment, imports and public
expenditures, the longer-term perspective should involve also using aid for
boosting recipient countries’ ability to mobilize their own resources. This
would entail provision of financial and technical support for mobilization of
the domestic savings needed for investments (closing the savings gap), a
subject treated in detail by Kovsted (2000). Here we consider measures
directed at enhancing import capacity by using aid for export promotion
(closing the trade gap), as well as aid supported initiatives intended to
strengthen the capacity for revenue and expenditure management of recipient
governments (closing the fiscal gap).
CLOSING THE TRADE GAP
Foreign aid fills the trade gap in the short run, where import reducing
initiatives may also be considered in order to pursue economic stabilisation.
However, the long-run development objective is that a country’s own export
earnings should be more or less sufficient to meet import requirements. Since
import reduction is not conducive to the long-run growth process, this
objective has to be pursued through export promotion (or, more precisely,
achieving growth in export receipts in excess of that of import payments).
27
 However, critics of aid from a dependency perspective argue that the focus of
international agencies on increasing developing country exports illustrates the role
of aid in forcing these countries to a subordinate position in the world economy (see,
e.g. Hayter and Watson 1985).
28
 Of course, so long as prices are not perfectly correlated, a country experiences less
earnings variation by producing two crops with variable prices rather than one.
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Accordingly, while import substitution was widely supported by aid donors
in the sixties and seventies, far greater emphasis should in the future be
placed on measures geared at export promotion.27
Export promotion consists of both raising export levels for existing products
and of diversification into what are typically called non-traditional exports.
Diversification is important since many countries remain reliant on a narrow
range of primary products. Developing countries export only half as many
products as do developed ones, and Africa only half the number from other
developing regions (see table in the Appendix). Primary products are both
subject to greater price fluctuation than are manufactured products and are
believed by many to be subject to a secular decline in their relative price.28
Diversification allows both branching out into higher value added activities
and reducing exposure to price fluctuations.
Foreign aid can promote exports through three main channels: (i) supporting
a conducive policy environment; (ii) financing infrastructural development;
and (iii) direct support to export promotion. Each of these is discussed in turn.
The policy environment. Since the early 1980s programme aid (mostly
balance-of-payments support and debt relief) has been conditional upon
implementing policies agreed with the World Bank and IMF. These policies
promote a market-oriented development strategy and are intended to increase
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the production of tradable goods, and more specifically exports. Most
bilateral donors “buy into” World Bank/IMF programmes, though some may
have additional conditionalities at the sector level; USAID, for example, has
financed trade and investment programmes in several countries. The policy
measures most relevant for export growth are (i) a move to a liberalised
exchange rate regime, which usually implies a very substantial devaluation
and often begins with retention schemes by which exporters can keep a share
of their foreign exchange earnings rather than having to surrender them at the
official rate; (ii) reduction and eventual removal of explicit export taxes and
the implicit taxes implemented through price controls (operated through a
monopsonistic state marketing board); and (iii) import liberalisation, which
can reduce the price of imported inputs such as fertiliser. On the other hand
adverse effects may be felt by the removal of subsidies for agricultural
production and an increase in interest rates. 
Most studies of the effect of adjustment policies find that export performance
is the one area in which a positive impact is most likely to be felt. The World
Bank, in its study on Adjustment in Africa found that ‘countries with the
largest improvements in macroeconomic policies enjoyed the highest median
growth in exports and had by far the largest surge in export growth’ (World
Bank 1994: 153). Mosley et al. (1995) utilise each of the control group
method, regressions and model simulations: five out of the six results
reported show a positive impact on export growth (compared to two for GDP
growth and none for the investment rate). In the review by Lensink (1996) of
African studies similar results were found for World Bank programmes,
though IMF ones are found to have a negative effect. In sum, policy reform
appears to have a positive effect on export growth. Yet, it can be asked what
role aid has played in supporting the reforms which have taken place in most
developing countries. Whilst there is a growing feeling that aid has failed to
buy reform, this conclusion is nuanced in relation to the type of reform. The
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policy measures of most interest here - notably liberalisation of the foreign
exchange market, but also export and import duty reductions - are amongst
those where there does appear to have been a degree of influence in many
countries. Indeed, as argued earlier, there are reasons to think that aid may
have assisted the move to more liberalised forex regimes, and the associated
exchange rate depreciation, in several countries.
Two caveats should be made to this positive picture. The first is that some
argue that the export increase is not of the sort that will bring widespread
benefits. For example, Gibbon et al. (1993) argue that increased exports have
come from extractive foreign investment and are prone to the fallacy of
composition (increased output will reduce prices and so not raise incomes),
and criticisms of footloose labour-intensive industries are well known.
Second, diversification has not been that great, especially in Africa and Latin
America and the Caribbean. Indeed, classifying countries by policy stance
(using the classification from Adjustment in Africa) shows that countries with
the largest improvements in macro policy have become more concentrated
rather than less (see table in the Appendix).
The main recommendation in terms of aid policy emerging from the above
review is that, to the extent aid impacts on policy, the implications for export
promotion need to be carefully considered.
Improving infrastructure. Despite the apparent success in increasing exports
by the late eighties it was common-place to remark that “getting the prices
right” was a necessary but not sufficient condition for restoring growth in
exports or output more generally. Adequate infrastructure is also required for
a supply response to occur. Such investments have been a traditional part of
aid, typically accounting for around 20 per cent of commitments (Hjertholm
and White 2000). Aid may finance general infrastructure, notably roads,
29
 Typical of the conflicting objectives of donor agencies is the fact that aid also
support penetration of the recipient market by donor country firms.
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which open areas up to commercial production, or more specifically export-
oriented infrastructure, such as that for export zones.
Despite falling out of fashion, infrastructure is, with the exception of
railways, something donors can do reasonably well. A World Bank review
found infrastructure projects to have consistently performed better than the
average (Morra and Thumm 1977, vol.2: 41), although adequate maintenance
of the infrastructure after donor involvement may, on the other hand, be a
different matter. However, as such, this area appears as a promising area of
aid intervention also in the future.
Direct export promotion. Finally donors may give direct support to export
promotion, usually focussing on non-traditional exports. Such projects
typically comprise management and technical support to selected export
firms, provision of market information and other support to market
penetration (e.g. participation at trade fairs),29 and institutional development
of relevant bodies, such as exporters’ associations and standards’ offices.
Credit may also be provided, but the market-oriented philosophy of most
donors means that cheap credit is most usually frowned upon (though the
management and marketing services are subsidised, and this subsidy is
accepted by the donor community).
Synthesis studies of USAID support to export promotion (Bremer et al. 1994
and McKean and Fox 1994) present a generally positive picture, though it is
stated that such support is only worthwhile if the policy environment is right
30
 Another USAID report (Rock 1993) finds that government export promotion
services in Korea had ‘minimal impact on export expansion.’
31
 The evaluation of CIDAs Jamaica Export Promotion Project, which had not
included investment promotion, recommended it be included when the scheme was
replicated elsewhere in the region (CIDA 1993).
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and there is a suspicion of too great a role for public sector bodies.30 Export
markets are most successfully secured by establishing links with a foreign
partner, and indeed such projects often combine trade and investment
promotion.31 Critics of aid might therefore argue that if the market is allowed
to function, and foreign investment flow in, then these supply chains will
develop so as to increase developing country exports. More generally, the
value of increased exports which may be ascribed to such projects is not
sufficient to be of macroeconomic significance.
The overall picture with respect to past experience is therefore mixed. Policy
reform does appear to increase exports, although there remain questions as to
the extent to which reform can be attributed to aid and diversification is
proceeding only slowly if at all. Support through infrastructure and direct
export promotion can claim some success, but their macro significance should
not be overstated.
CLOSING THE FISCAL GAP
The largest share of foreign aid is provided in support of public expenditures.
Aid therefore helps fill the fiscal gap - a situation which is likely to continue
in the short- to medium-term. Accordingly, much of the rationale for the
programme aid provided during the nineties has been focussed on filling
gaps. Nevertheless, the long-run objective of aid is that a country’s revenue
efforts should be - more or less - sufficient to cover its public expenditures.
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With the successful reforms of trade and exchange rate regimes undertaken
by many developing countries in the eighties, increasing emphasis has
therefore been placed on closing the fiscal gap in structural adjustment
programmes during the nineties. Apart from reducing aid dependence, the
rationale for this emphasis involves that a reduction of the fiscal deficit, in
particular a reduction of the domestic financing of such a deficit, has been
and remains key to achieving and maintaining macroeconomic stability,
which is needed to promote long-term growth.
Closing the fiscal gap involves (i) increasing government revenue in a
manner, which minimises the distortionary nature of taxation and/or (ii)
promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditures. While reduction
of public expenditures may be pursued in the short run with a view to
economic stabilisation, expenditures are in the longer run likely to rise if
government is to perform the necessary activities in support of sustainable
growth. As noted above, public spending aimed at reducing the impediments
to growth implied by inadequate economic infrastructure (such as lack of
access to electricity or an inadequate road structure) and insufficient social
services (such as education and health) is of major importance in developing
countries. In sum, closing the fiscal gap is of critical importance, but focus
must be on revenue and the effectiveness of public expenditures rather than
on mere size.
Increasing government revenue. In the early years of structural adjustment,
particular focus was given to rationalising the export duty and import tariff
regime in line with the liberal economic trade policies pursued. Such efforts
can reduce revenue collection in the short run, but the expectation is that tariff
rationalisation, including the reduction of evasion and avoidance, will be
revenue-enhancing in the longer term. Simultaneously, efforts were made to
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switch from taxes on external trade to domestic taxes (e.g. increasing excise
taxes on certain items, such as petroleum, alcohol and tobacco).
The most widespread of these efforts has been the introduction of value added
tax (VAT) to replace traditional sales taxes in a large number of developing
countries over the past decade. The VAT has a number of distinct advantages,
including that it reduces economic distortions, since traditional sales taxes at
all levels of production and sales introduce a bias towards vertically
integrated firms. Such a firm only pays the sales tax once. An element of self-
control is also involved as firms have an incentive to require VAT paid on
their purchases in order to subtract this from their own VAT due. As the VAT
is more complicated to administer than traditional sales taxes, it has been
argued that developing countries with limited administrative capacity should
not introduce this tax. Experience to date shows, however, that despite initial
opposition to the VAT from the taxpayers and some loss of revenue during the
first six months of operation, this tax has been successfully introduced in
several countries. Finally, in addition to the VAT, efforts are being made in
many developing countries to increase revenues from direct taxation, such as
business and corporate taxes and some form of personal taxation, typically
payroll taxes. 
Despite the above efforts to increase public revenues, tax revenue in
developing countries remain low; the average of total tax revenue is about 20
per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, far below the average for OECD countries of
about 35 per cent. Thus, the key challenge faced is, as already alluded to
above, to increase taxes while at the same time trying to minimise their
distortionary nature. This is so since the negative growth impact of
inadequate provision of public services may well thwart growth in the long
term. It follows that expanding the tax base is also an important challenge,
and substantial efforts are required to enhance the effectiveness of tax
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administrations in many countries. This include the introduction of self-
assessments, substantial training of staff in revenue authorities and
computerisation of, e.g. tax registers to allow checks of taxpayer information
across different types of taxes. Such efforts at institutional capacity building
are costly and of longer term duration, and as such open up many avenues for
aid, including technical assistance, to be of use in furthering growth. 
Expenditure management. The other way to close the fiscal gap in the longer
run is to make public expenditures more effective. Expenditure reduction was
at the forefront of adjustment programmes from the start. This was due - in
part - to the fact that substantial expenditure reductions can be achieved at a
faster rate than increasing revenues and hence, was the only way to quickly
alleviate the fiscal gap and the attendant stabilisation problems. It also
reflected the consensus that some expenditure items were not conducive to
growth, including, for example, the support given to state-owned enterprises.
On the other hand, privatisation was pursued as an efficiency enhancing
policy, and in this area there have been notable achievements. In many
developing countries a large number of enterprises have been privatised and
the most important of those remaining are public utilities, such as electricity
and water. The extent to which the private sector can be involved in the
provision of “public” services in future remains a much debated issue.
Turning to the public sector wage bill, there has been retrenchment of civil
servants in many developing countries. Yet, the need for increasing the
numbers of, say, nurses and school teachers has in many cases become
apparent. In addition, the need to increase remuneration is by now critical, as
salary levels are typically too low to attract professional staff for the civil
service. 
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It is difficult to draw general lessons from civil service reform in developing
countries, as the critical issues of further reforms of the public administration
vary widely from country to country (see also Berg 2000). Nevertheless,
consideration of public expenditure issues can usefully be split into three
levels: (i) the issue of aggregate fiscal control, i.e. controlling the size of the
fiscal deficit to be within a realistic short-run macroeconomic framework; (ii)
the strategic allocation of expenditures across different sectors; and (iii) the
effectiveness and efficiency of expenditures within a given sector or sub-
sector. Much success has been achieved regarding aggregate fiscal control
over the past decade, but many challenges still remain in addressing the last
two points.
This can be illustrated by the fact that the cash budget system which has
enabled many countries to maintain aggregate control has in many cases had
an adverse impact on budget planning and implementation. Actual
expenditure allocation has varied substantially from month to month,
implying the budget process in many aid dependent developing countries has
more or less broken down. The result is that the state budget does not work
as a planning tool, as actual expenditures within any given sector tend to be
very different from the budgeted allocation. In addition, most budgets in aid
dependent developing countries do not account for all or even most foreign
aid. It is channelled directly to end-uses, completely by-passing the
government. It has therefore become very difficult for political
decisionmakers to play their role in ensuring that government policy priorities
are reflected in the strategic allocation of actual public expenditures across
different sectors. Furthermore, the break-down of the budget process has
made it difficult to develop the necessary transparency over public
expenditures and maintain accountability for these. Public expenditure
reviews (PER), typically led by the World Bank, has been the main instrument
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with which to try to address such issues, and this instrument being critically
discussed in Berg (2000).
Longer-term planning of all expenditures are key to improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditures and hence, to improving
the results obtained (such as increases in the number of children who receive
primary education or health care). In aid dependent countries, foreign aid
finances more than half of all expenditures and donors may therefore appear
to be legitimate stakeholders in the process of budget planning and
implementation, although their role is properly confined to ensuring
transparent procedures and accountability to the local people. With the move
to new aid modalities, particularly the adoption of sector programme support
by many donor agencies (see Andersen 2000), external assistance is becoming
an integral part of public expenditures. While the allocation of total public
expenditures, including both governments own resources and foreign aid, has
always been important in any assessment of public expenditures, these new
aid modalities bring out such issues much clearer. Moreover, efforts are now
being made in a number of countries to include sector programmes in a
medium-term fiscal framework, which includes all public expenditure
financing and attempts to ensure consistency with the macroeconomic
framework being pursued. 
As has been indicated above, the role of foreign aid in filling the fiscal gap
is very large indeed, particularly in aid dependent countries. Furthermore, it
is beyond doubt that foreign aid will continue to play a key role in helping
close the fiscal gap for some time to come. Increasing the level of tax
revenues takes a long time and needs to be carefully balanced with the
objectives of encouraging economic growth. This requires skills and
experience which many countries do not possess. Thus, aid has a role to play.
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The same goes - as is clear from this section - for the management and control
of public expenditures. 
4. Conclusions
The traditional macroeconomic rationale for foreign aid relates to its ability
to supplement domestic savings, foreign exchange and government revenue,
thereby contributing to higher economic growth. The economic processes
envisioned presumes a simple Harrod-Domar context in which economic
growth is driven by physical capital formation. However, as this chapter
makes clear, the macroeconomic reality of foreign aid recipients is much
more complicated. Three examples of complicating factors have been
discussed: (i) the effects of aid on government fiscal behaviour, (ii) the
problem of foreign debt and (iii) Dutch disease effects.
Over the longer term, rather than merely filling gaps, foreign aid should play
a role in closing gaps. The merit of being increasingly able to finance
investment with domestic savings, imports with export earnings, and
government spending with government revenue, is obvious: reliance on
foreign aid and (perhaps especially) foreign borrowing is diminished and
economic policy autonomy is increased. Closing the savings gap entails, on
the part of aid donors, financial and technical support for mobilisation of
domestic savings (Kovsted 2000). Closing the trade gap entails export growth
in excess of import growth (so the gap can be closed without reducing
imports from present levels). Donors can support this endeavour by
supporting a macroeconomic environment conducive to export growth, by
helping to expand and improve the physical infrastructure, and by direct
support for export activities, notably those of a non-traditional nature. 
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With respect to the fiscal gap, this can in the longer run be closed by
increasing government revenue and improving expenditure management. But,
unlike the savings and forex gaps, fiscal closure is a more delicate task;
public expenditures may be critical for growth, but at the same time taxes
come along with distortions. When closing the savings-investment gap,
emphasis is on “ever” higher savings, so productive investments can be
expanded. Similarly for the trade gap; since maintaining productive import
is important, emphasis is on “ever” higher exports. In terms of the fiscal gap,
however, where maintaining productive government spending is also critical,
government taxation cannot simply be “ever” expanding since it brings about
distortions and thus economic disincentives. Thus, closing the fiscal gap is a
much more difficult job to do, and one in which donors and recipient
governments will have to carefully balance the disadvantage of lower-than-
needed government spending against the disadvantage of higher government
taxation.
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Appendix
Export diversification, 1980 and 1994.
1980 1994 Change
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
Overall
Developed countries
Mean 208 0.169 210 0.169 2.0 7%
Median 226 0.109 225 0.120 1.0 14%
Developing countries
Mean 95 0.499 105 0.420 9.8 -12%
Median 83 0.467 90 0.375 8.0 -18%
Developing countries by region
Africa
Mean 58 0.565 57 0.544 -0.6 -1%
Median 47 0.534 43 0.565 -2.0 -5%
Asia and Pacific
Mean 115 0.350 135 0.296 19.8 -6%
Median 97 0.303 152 0.241 11.0 -16%
Latin America and Caribbean
Mean 106 0.436 112 0.323 6.1 -22%
Median 98 0.399 104 0.316 8.0 -25%
Middle East and North Africa
Mean 109 0.704 130 0.562 21.4 -21%
Median 104 0.802 134 0.642 27.0 -22%
...countinues
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1980 1994 Change
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
No. of
exports
Concent.
index
Sub-Saharan African countries classified by policy change
Large improvement in macro policies
Mean 80 0.500 81 0.547 0.0 11%
Median 83 0.476 73 0.600 -15.0 21%
Small improvement in macro policies
Mean 61 0.550 57 0.519 -4.0 -4%
Median 47 0.501 47 0.565 5.0 -7%
Deterioration in macro policies
Mean 55 0.544 45 0.545 -9.0 2%
Median 43 0.456 37 0.485 -11.0 -15%
Note: Concentartion index ranges from 0 to 1, with lower values for less export
concentration.
Source: UNCTAD (1996).
